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1. INTRODUCTION
In his paper on the fallacy of composition, Maurice Finocchiaro puts forward several
important theses about this fallacy. He also uses it to illustrate his view that fallacies
should be studied in light of the notion of meta-argumentation at the core of his
recent book (Finocchiaro, 2013).
First, he expresses his puzzlement. Some authors have claimed that this
fallacy is quite common (this is the ubiquity thesis) but it seems to have been
neglected by scholars. This second point does not seem to be controversial but the
ubiquity thesis is open to discussion. For instance, Finocchiaro reminds us that
Kahane (1973, p. 244) granted that this fallacy has not been given much scrutiny
and explained this lack of interest by its rarity. This comforting explanation clearly
goes against the ubiquity thesis.
How is it that few studies have been devoted to this fallacy? There is certainly
no obvious relation between the frequency of a fallacy and the interest that scholars
pay to it. It is likely that a fallacy having many faces or depending on many
circumstantial parameters will inspire more studies than a simpler one, but things
may not be that simple. If there is a link between the ubiquity of the fallacy of
composition and the fact that there are few studies about it, it may be because many
compositional problems go unnoticed or are not identified as such. The difficulty to
detect and qualify some compositional problems is quite compatible with the
ubiquity thesis. In any case, Finocchiaro rightly stresses that this fallacy should be
more precisely and more empirically documented.
2. PARTS AND WHOLE
First, it should be remembered that this fallacy concerns a relation which is often
quite straightforward but is sometimes quite tricky. It is even the subject matter of a
theory – mereology – having a far reaching root in philosophy and a lot of
contemporary developments in logic, ontology, metaphysics and psychology.
Mereology can be briefly defined as the study of parthood or of the relation between
parts and whole. One of its basic claims is that compositional reasoning is quite
frequent and a plausible explanation of this frequency is that the relation between
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parts and whole would be one of the most elementary cognitive links.
However, it is not always the same link but rather a kind of relation for it has
modalities much more diverse and complex than it may appear at first sight. This is
certainly why inferences from parts to whole follow no common logical rule, are not
always valid and are open to a variety of mistakes and confusions. If this is true,
Finocchiaro is right to criticize some textbooks examples which are too gross to be
faithful to the complexity of the parts-whole relation. Of course, in a didactic context
you often need easy examples to show that the compositional inference that is valid
in some cases is also blatantly false in others. But this does not account for the
variety of relations which may exist between parts and whole. Just look at the
following list of examples that is certainly not exhaustive:
(1) My arm is part of my body.
(2) The west side is the most typical area of this city. No! It’s the north!
(3) Each and every citizen is part of the country.
(4) Paris, it's France!
(5) Sorry, I missed part of your talk.
Mathematics is a field full of stimulating ideas about composition. Remember,
for instance, Russell's barber, one of the most famous paradoxes that plagued early
set theory. A crucial move to avoid it has been to make an explicit distinction
between being a member of a set and being a part of this set. But this is not an easy
distinction. It looks difficult and artificial for beginners. It is usually easy for them to
understand that this or that integer or a small group of integers makes a part of
integers. But it is more difficult to accept a sharp distinction between the number
seven, one of the elements of the set of integers and the set having seven as only
member, this set being a part, not an element, of the set of integers.
Infinite sets also provide puzzling examples against the common, but false,
compositional principle that the parts are necessarily smaller than the whole. Many
people ‘intuitively’ think that even integers are less numerous than integers. At first
sight, they are two times less numerous since only one on two integers is even. But
this is “a type of common but logically incorrect argument”, namely a fallacy
according to a definition offered by Finocchiaro (2005, p. 113). This mistaken
reasoning is not isolated but typical and so, to keep on with Finocchiaro's normative
vocabulary, it is a “logical sin” (2005, p. 116) or “a vice of argumentation” as he said
in the first sentence of his talk. Fortunately, this collective mathematical vice had a
happy end, for mathematicians finally triumphed over it and can now spread the
good news that even integers are as numerous as integers. In this case, we should
now not hesitate to bridge the gap from part to whole.
You do not need to call to the abstruse mathematics of the infinite to doubt
the necessity of the “law” that the parts are smaller than the whole. My first example
– “my arm is part of my body” – seems a paradigmatic positive instance of it. But
look at the fifth one, “Sorry, I missed part of your talk”. Who can say that it is not a
polite understatement meaning “I missed the whole of your talk”? And what should
we think of “I like the whole of your talk, especially the first part”? In my opinion,
the pragmatics of composition (and division) in the field of politeness should suffice
2
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to convince us of the ubiquity of compositional reasonings (at least in this field) and
also of their fallacious versions. This strengthens my opinion that John Woods
(2004) has a good point when he says that behind a fallacy lies a philosophical
problem: the fallacy of composition and its twin sister about division certainly come
out of a general difficult epistemic relation between whole and parts.
3. COMPOSITION
Michel's iron law is an example of a compositional move that you may (or may not)
identify as fallacious. This is all the more difficult since the fallacy can have different
structures. Finocchiaro distinguishes three possibilities: reasoning from premises
using a term distributively to a conclusion using the same term collectively,
reasoning from some properties of the parts to the same property of the whole,
reasoning from some property of the members of the group to the same property of
the entire group. If you stick too much to one structure you can miss another one.
T. Govier (2007) discusses another possibility. Some fallacies of composition
can go unnoticed because they are assimilated or reduced to another fallacy. First,
she considers two common verbal practices involving a compositional move. The
first one is synecdoche, the figure of speech using a part to mean the whole. “Paris,
it’s France” is an example opening to others like “Yesterday, Paris met Berlin in
Italy”. The second one is stereotype, a notion that Govier briefly defines as the fact
that “a group is cast according to the attributes of some few individuals within it” (p.
508). Compositional problems are present here but no reasoning, therefore no
fallacious reasoning, is yet clearly involved.
When she gets to fallacies, Govier sees two candidates to welcome the fallacy
of composition: hasty generalization and equivocation. First, let us note that these
two fallacies are themselves not reducible to a simple scheme: they are what I will
call generic fallacies. This feature is an advantage to host other fallacies.
One aspect of what is quickly called “the” problem of induction is that an
(incomplete) induction, ampliative or not, is always more or less hasty. More or less,
that is the question. This native vice of induction seems to have contaminated some
fallacious compositional reasonings. And as far as equivocation is concerned,
Finocchiaro reminds us that long before Van Eemeren and Grootendorst stressed
that bridging the gap from part to whole is favored by equivocation, Aristotle dealt
with composition and division in the section of On Sophistical Refutations devoted to
fallacies “in dictione” where equivocation appears in several places. Thus, it seems
quite possible that the study of the fallacy of composition spreads well beyond the
academic works which are explicitly devoted to it. You should just look for it under
different headings.
4. META-ARGUMENTATION
According to Finocchiaro, fallacies are neither theoretical concepts used only by
argumentation theorists, nor ordinary arguments even though they are quite
common. They should be considered as meta-arguments, that is arguments about
ground-level arguments which are themselves what I have just called ordinary
3
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arguments, that is argument about topics other than the argument at stake. This
highlights a feature that seems to me quite essential for the study of fallacies. I am
currently doing some research on the history of fallacies and I had the opportunity
to browse the whole catalogue of the French National Library, the largest French
library. This overview confirmed my former impression that there is almost no
theoretical literature on fallacies in French. Of course, we know that there are
important writings like medieval contributions and the famous chapters of the
Logique of Port-Royal. But when you just look at the titles of books and documents
from the eighteenth to the twentieth century there is almost nothing if you compare
with the blooming English literature on this topic. I mean that there is almost no
theoretical literature. But there is an amount of titles including eclectic charges of
fallacy, all of them confirming an unsurprising constant: fallacies are committed by
an opponent, by an opposing party. So, the charge of fallacious reasoning is not a
privilege of remote argumentation theorists but is also widely used on the
battlefield to disqualify the opponent's views. Just like meta-discursive remarks can
be part of an ordinary speech, meta-arguments do not necessarily come after
ground level arguments or only from critical outsiders like argumentation theorists.
But ordinary arguers do not qualify them as meta-argumentation for they are not
concerned by this kind of theoretical distinction.
Maurice Finocchiaro discusses Michel’s “iron law of oligarchy” and its critics.
It should be noted that these critics are convincing only if you assume that in a
democracy, there is normally some competition between political parties or other
groups playing a major political role. To make more salient the importance of this
implicit normative assumption for the meta-arguments stressing a fallacy of
composition, imagine a country claiming to be a democracy but where there are also
strong connections or interpenetrations between the most influential political
groups, for instance between political parties and the media, between the
government and a party, or between unions and the state administration. In such a
case Dahl’s and Lipset’s meta-arguments are certainly weaker, for the oligarchy that
they acknowledge in the parties and the other politically influential groups could
spread beyond their institutional limits, certainly in a hidden way, and contaminate
the whole political system. So, the relevance of the charge of fallacy of composition
depends on the political presumptions shared, or not, by Michel and his critics. I am
not claiming that this conclusion stressing the dialectical side of the charge of fallacy
applies in any case. It still has to be documented by further studies.
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